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PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY
SEA ACT: A BULKHEAD IS BREACHED-Armada Supply v. SIT
Agios Nikolas, 639 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Armada Supply v. SIT Agios Nikolas was'described as "no 'run-of-the-
mill' cargo case," but rather a case involving "charges of cargo hijacking
and blackmail, ransom and deceit-all the elements of a good high seas
drama, short of mutiny. "I The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, after awarding full compensatory damages, imposed
$250,000 in punitive damages against the owners of the vessel because of
reprehensible conduct in converting the cargo, and in blackmailing and
deceiving the cargo owner. The court awarded punitive damages after it
acknowledged that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)2 governed
the action, and despite language in section 4(5) of COGSA that "[iun no
event shall the carrier be liable for more than the amount of damage actually
sustained. "3
The court's punitive damage award in a COGSA action creates a hole in
the statute's intended exclusive coverage. Further, the court failed to
articulate a standard to guide the future imposition of punitive damages. In
order to establish the boundaries of COGSA's application, this Note
proposes that courts focus on COGSA's preemption of general maritime
law remedies. Under this analysis, criminally culpable conduct-defined
as conduct exhibiting reckless indifference to the rights of others coupled
with intent to commit a criminal act-falls outside COGSA's coverage,
allowing the imposition of punitive damages in the extraordinary case. This
proposal punishes the egregious conduct before the court in Armada
Supply, yet protects both the integrity and exclusivity of COGSA.
1. 613 F. Supp. 1459, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The trial.court issued two opinions in this case. The
first opinion granted cargo consignee Armada Supply compensatory damages and requested briefs on
the punitive damage question. This Note examines the second opinion granting punitive damages,
Armada Supply v. S/T Agios Nikolas, 639 F Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982).
3. Section 4(5) reads:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in
connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package. . . ,or in
the case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit,. . . unless the nature and
value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of
lading. ...
By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier, and the shipper another
maximum amount than that mentioned in this paragraph may be fixed: Provided, That such
maximum shall not be less than the figure above named. In no event shall the carrier be liablefor
more than the amount of damage actually sustained. ...
Id. § 4(5), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (emphasis added).
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I. THE SCOPE OF DAMAGE RECOVERY UNDER COGSA
Congress enacted COGSA in 19364 to promote international shipping
and commerce by ensuring uniformity in contracts of ocean carriage to or
from the United States. 5 COGSA achieved uniformity by realigning the
rights and duties of carriers and shippers under general maritime law.
Shippers gained restraints on carriers' freedom to contract for reduced
levels of liability. In return, carriers received liability limitations and
exceptions relieving their responsibility as insurers under general maritime
law.6
A. COGSA as an Exclusive Cause of Action
COGSA provides the exclusive cause of action for cargo loss and
damage. Actions based on state law or general maritime law for breach of
contract, negligence, or conversion cannot be brought when COGSA
applies. 7 Two principal grounds for this exclusivity can be identified. First,
Congress often includes a "saving clause" when enacting remedial legisla-
tion in order to retain common law remedies, including punitive damages. 8
4. COGSA was enacted to implement the 1924 Brussels Convention on Uniform Ocean Bills of
Lading. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug.
25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. See generally I S. SORKIN, HOwTO RECOVER
FOR Loss OR DAMAGE TO GOODS IN TRANSIT, §§ 3.06, 3.07 (1986) (discussing background of COGSA's
enactment in 1936).
5. See generally 2a BENEDICr ON ADMIRALTY 2-14 (rev. 7th ed. 1987). COGSA governs from the
time loading commences until unloading is complete. This "tackle-to-tackle" scope for COGSA is
mandated in section l(e). 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1982); see In re Intercontinental Properties Manage-
ment, S.A., 604 F.2d 254, 261 (4th Cir. 1979). The Harter Act of 1893 controls while the goods are in
the carrier's possession before loading or afterdischarge. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196(1982). By agreement,
COGSA's application can be extended to this period. COGSA § 11, 46 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982).
COGSA applies in two ways. Parties can incorporate COGSA into the bill of lading, regardless of
whether the carriage is in foreign trade. See Colgate Palmolive Co. v. S/S Dart Canada, 724 F.2d 313 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1983). COGSA also applies by its own force to "[e]very bill of lading
• . . which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United
States, in foreign trade .... ." COGSA § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1982); see Sunkist Growers v.
Adelaide Shipping Lines, 603 F2d 1327 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1979).
6. See 2a BENEDICT, supra note 5, §§ 11, 15, 16. Under general maritime law a carrier could escape
liability only if it proved damage was caused by an act of God, the public enemy, the inherent nature of
the property, the public authority, or the act or default of the shipper. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW
OF ADMIRALTY 140 (2d ed. 1975).
7. See, e.g., National Automotive Publications v. United States Lines, 486 F. Supp. 1094, 1099,
1101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also B.F. McKernin & Co. v. United States Lines, 416 F. Supp. 1068,
1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (remedies provided in COGSA are exclusive; no alternative liability under state
law or general maritime law for breach of contract or conversion due to delayed delivery).
8. For example, the Carmack Amendment, section 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104,
24 Stat. 386 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11) (West 1951) and repealed 1978),
provided that a rail carrier is liable for the "full actual loss" caused by it. Section 20(11) also contained a
saving clause. Id. See Reed v. Aaacon Auto Transp., 637 F.2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 1981) (Carmack
Amendment saves all common law remedies, including punitive damages); Hubbard v. Allied Van
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COGSA, however, contains no such saving clause. Second, COGSA
explicitly regulates both tortious and contractual behavior. 9 Once a party
establishes the applicability of COGSA, 10 other claims and bases for
recovery are void, even if the petition contains no reference to COGSA. 11
Courts have ruled that the duties and liabilities of the carrier arise solely
from the terms of the statute. 12 Therefore, the cargo owner cannot bring
additional or alternative claims for breach of contract, negligent handling
of cargo, or common law tortious conversion under state law or general
maritime law. 13
Lines, 540 F.2d 1224, 1227-30(4th Cir. 1976) (saving clause indicates Congress did not intend to limit
carrier liability under other laws). The Interstate Commerce Act was repealed and reenacted by Pub. L.
No. 95-473, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978). The section 20(11) saving clause is now found in 49
U.S.C. § 10,103 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134F. Supp. 704,706 (S.D. Tex. 1955) (COGSA
governs liability, whether the action sounds in tort or contract). COOSA imposes a duty on the carrier to
properly load, handle, stow, carry, care for, and discharge the goods. COGSA § 3(1), (2), 46 U.S.C.
§ 1303(1), (2) (1982). COGSA also voids any contract of carriage relieving the carrier from liability
from negligence, fault, or failure to fulfill the COGSA duties. Id. § 3(8), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8).
Two recent international conventions on the carriage of goods by sea clarify this point for foreign
jurisdictions. Both specifically provide that the convention is exclusive, regardless of whether the action
sounds in tort or contract. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, March 31,
1978, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/5 (Hamburg Rules) (defenses and liability limitations apply "in
any action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to the goods covered by the contract of
carriage by sea. . . whether the action is founded in contract, in tort or otherwise"), reprinted in 6
BENEDICr, supra note 5, at 1-32.5; Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, art. 3(1), Brussels, Feb. 23, 1968 (Visby
Amendments) (defense and liability limitations apply "in any action against the carrier in respect of
loss or damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage whether the action be founded in contract or in
tort"), reprinted in 6 BENEDICr, supra note 5, at 1-25. The United States has signed but not ratified the
protocol. The Visby Amendments are in force for the 26 countries that have ratified the protocol. Only
10 nations have ratified the Hamburg Rules, scheduled to come into effect upon ratification by 20
nations. The United States has not signed the Hamburg Rules. See 2S. SoRIN, supra note 4, § 1.20[l],
cum. supp. at 35-37. For a discussion of these conventions and their effect on uniformity, see Yancey,
The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby, and Hamburg, 57 TuL. L. REv. 1238 (1983).
10. See supra note 5.
11. Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704, 706 (S.D. Tex. 1955); National
Automotive Publications v. United States Lines, 486 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
12. Crispin, 134 F. Supp. at 706.
13. Id.; see National Automotive, 486 F Supp. at 1099 (the exclusive nature of COOSA dictates
that a plaintiff cannot assert additional theories for recovery); see also Reisman v. Medafrica Lines,
U.S.A., 592 F. Supp. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (breach of contract, negligence, and conversion claims
are the common law equivalents of actions for which COGSA was meant to be the exclusive definition
of liability in the shipper-carrier context); B.F. McKernin & Co. v. United States Lines, 416 F. Supp.
1068, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (supplemental claims for breach of contract, conversion, or negligence
may not be brought when COGSA governs the relationship).
Washington Law Review Vol 62:523, 1987
B. Recovery Under COGSA
1. Recovery for Loss or Damage to Goods Under COGSA
Under COGSA, a variance in the condition or quantity of the goods at
destination from that described in the bill of lading establishes a prima facie
case for recovery. 14 If the carrier does not refute the prima facie case, the
shipper may collect damages measured by market value upon arrival. 15
Because section 4(5) limits recovery to "damage actually sustained," if
more accurate means are available to determine actual loss, such as a resale
contract, the cargo owner recovers that amount instead of market value. 16
Section 4(5) defines both a maximum and minimum level of damages
under the two distinct types of contracts of carriage COGSA governs. First,
in contracts where the shipper does not declare the value of the goods
shipped, section 4(5) establishes maximum carrier liability of $500 per
package or customary freight unit. 17 Carriers are also prohibited from
contracting for liability below this limit under any circumstances. 18 There-
fore, when loss is greater than $500 per unit, the cargo owner is guaranteed
14. Section 3(4) of COGSA establishes the bill of lading as prima facie evidence of the condition of
the goods at the time of delivery to the carrier. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(4) (1982). A cargo owner establishes a
prima facie case when the cargo owner proves delivery of the goods to the vessel at port of shipment in
satisfactory condition, and arrival of less cargo than was delivered and/or discharge of the goods in
damaged condition. Westway Coffee Corp. v. M.V. Netuno, 675 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 812 (2d Cir. 1971) ("bailor makes out a prima
facie case merely by showing delivery of the goods to the bailee and failure to return at the required
time").
15. Intematio, Inc. v. M.S. Taimyr, 602 F.2d 49,50 (2d Cir. 1979) (damages are measured by "the
market value of the goods at destination, in like condition as they were shipped, on the date when they
should have arrived").
16. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1930) (market value only a convenient
means of determining the loss suffered). Where cargo is shipped on a resale contract, courts calculate
damages to compensate for what the cargo owner would have received had the resale contract been
performed. See Austracan (U.S.A.) v. Neptune Orient Lines, 612 F. Supp. 578, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(resale contract furnishes most accurate means to measure damages actually sustained in either rising or
falling market). Thus, in a rising market the cargo owner cannot receive damages based on market price
if such price leads to compensation in excess of the resale contract. Internaio, 602 F.2d at 50. The
resale contract is also used to calculate damages when the cargo owner suffers no loss due to salvage.
B.F. McKernin & Co. v. United States Lines, 416 F. Supp. 1068, 1071-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
17. See supra note 3 (text of COGSA § 4(5)). The term "package" and "customary freight unit" as
used in COGSA are terms of art. Their definitions are the subject of much litigation and beyond the
scope of this Note. See generally 2 S. SORKIN, supra note 4, § 13.16[ 1][c], [2].
The limitation is only available if the shipper has an opportunity to set a higher limit by declaring a
higher value and paying a higher rate. Circuits are split on whether the shipper must declare value or
whether the carrier must offer. See id. § 13.16[1][d].
18. See Shinko Boeki Co. v. S.S. Pioneer Moon, 507 F.2d 342, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1974) (COGSA
§ 4(5) nullifies any provision in contract of carriage which reduces carrier's liability below $500 per
package). See generally 2 S. SORKIN, supra note 4, § 13.16[ l][c] (COGSA § 4(5) prevents carriers from
using their superior bargaining power to compel shippers to accept limitations reducing carrier liability
to insignificant amounts).
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recovery of $500 per package or unit. When loss is less than $500 per unit,
however, the package limitation has no practical effect because section 4(5)
limits recovery to "damage actually sustained."
The second type of COGSA contract is one in which the shipper declares
the nature and value of the goods and contracts with the carrier for liability
greater than $500 per package. Under this type of contract, the carrier
charges extra and becomes liable for the value declared. 19 Even under this
type of bill of lading, recovery is limited to "damage actually sustained." 20
2. Deviation and the COGSA Liability Limitation Provisions
Despite the exclusivity of COGSA, a carrier may lose the benefits of the
damage limitations and become subject to liability under general maritime
law by a geographic or other fundamental "deviation" from the contract of
carriage.
a. Evolution of the Deviation Doctrine
Long before COGSA's enactment, courts held that when a vessel devi-
ated from its specified or customary route, a different voyage was created.
The deviation voided any exculpatory provisions in the contract of carriage
and thus subjected the carrier to liability under general maritime law as an
insurer of the entire loss. 21 Today, COGSA requires that carriers not engage
in unreasonable deviations. 22 Courts have expanded the definition of devia-
19. General Motors Corp. v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 451 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1971). See
generally 2 S. SociN, supra note 4, § 13.16[1][d] (when the shipper describes nature and value of
cargo, the carrier is alerted of its potential liability and the opportunity to charge extra freight to cover its
liability).
20. If loss is less than total, or the declared value is greater than actual value, or the cargo owner
salvages part of the goods, the owner may only recover the actual damages sustained. See In re
Intematio, Inc. v. M.S. Taimyr, 602 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1979); B.E McKemin & Co. v. United States
Lines, 416 . Supp. 1068, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
21. See, e.g., The Citta di Messina, 169 F 472, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Joseph Thorley, Ltd. v.
Orchis S.S. Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 660, 667-68 (C.A.); see also Morgan, Unreasonable Deviation Under
COGSA, 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 481,484-85 (1978). See generally2S. SoP.Iu , supranote4, § 13.13[1],
cum. supp. at 77. The deviation doctrine arose because the shipper's insurance policy was void when
the vessel deviated, leaving shippers no avenue to recovery. Modem policies cover the risk of deviation,
but courts continue to impose liability on carriers for unreasonable deviation to encourage fulfillment of
their primary duty to care for cargo. See General Elec. Co. Int'l Sales Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706
F2d 80, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
22. COGSA § 4(4), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982). See 2 S. SoRKlN, supra note 4, § 13.13[l].
Congress intended to limit carrier ability to create broad liberty clauses permitting stops in almost any
port. See UNwo:OPm OcA Bts OFLADINo-HAGUE RuLEs, H.R. RaP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. I
(1936). Consequently, section 4(4) of COGSA provides that the carrier is liable only for "unreasonable
deviations" and explains that "if the deviation is for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo or
passengers it shall, prima facie, be regarded as unreasonable." 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982); see General
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tion, however, to include nongeographic breaches of the carriage contract
so fundamental that a shipper could justifiably repudiate the contract. 23
Such deviations are known as "quasi-deviations. ", 24 The doctrine of devia-
tion is presently under attack as inconsistent with COGSA and modern
marine insurance. 25 The trend is not to extend the quasi-deviation doctrine
even upon proof of criminal conduct. 26
b. Effect of a Finding of Unreasonable Deviation
The circuits are split on the effect of a finding of unreasonable deviation.
The dispute centers on whether the first paragraph of section 4(5), provid-
ing that neither the carrier nor the ship shall "in any event" become liable
for loss exceeding $500 per package, alters the pre-COGSA consequences
of unreasonable deviation. 27 The Seventh Circuit has held that this "in any
event" limitation indicates congressional intent to modify the general
maritime law consequences of deviation, and thus the carrier retains the
benefits of the COGSA liability limitations. 28 The Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Elec. Co. Int'l Sales Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849
(1983).
23. Morgan, supra note 21, at 483; see also Spartus Corp. v. S.S. Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310, 1313 (5th
Cir. 1979) (defining unreasonable deviation as "any variation in the conduct of a ship... whereby the
risk incident to the shipment will be increased,. .. Ior] whereby the goods have been subject to greater
risks").
24. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The most common quasi-
deviation is on-deck stowage of cargo under a clean bill of lading. A clean bill of lading requires stowage
under deck. The St. Johns N.F., 280 F. 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub noma. St. Johns N.F. Shipping
Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral Commercial, 263 U.S. 119 (1923). A clean bill of lading also contains
no indication that the goods were not received in good order. See generally I S. SORKIN, supra note 4,
§ 2.24[1]-[4).
25. The deviation doctrine is inconsistent because the first paragraph of section 4(5) provides that
"in any event" a carrier shall not be liable for more than $500 per package. In addition, today a shipper's
own insurance covers the risk of deviation. See Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, v. S.S. John
Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 6, at 183.
26. B.M.A. Indus. v. Nigerian Star Line, 786 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1986) (misdelivery of cargo does
not warrant finding of deviation even if due to criminal receipt of bribe); Italia Di Navigazione S.p.A. v.
M.V. Hermes 1, 724 F.2d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (nondelivery of cargo due to systematic theft does not
warrant finding of deviation which would void one-year statute of limitation specified in COGSA
§ 3(6)); Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, v. S.S. John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1974)
(doctrine of deviation not applied to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct in tendering an
unseaworthy ship because such a rule would "demand a further inquiry into the degree of the carrier's
culpability, with enormous potential liability, ... riding on the decision of the fact finder"), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
27. The "in any event" language of the first paragraph of section 4(5), limiting carrier liability to
$500 per package unless the parties have specifically contracted for greater carrier liability, should not
be confused with the "in no event" language in the second paragraph of section 4(5) limiting damages
to those actually sustained. See supra note 3 (text of COGSA § 4(5)).
28. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, 313 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir.) (because the
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Circuits, however, interpret section 4(5) as not changing the long-standing
maritime law regarding unreasonable deviations. Thus, a deviation in these
jurisdictions subjects the carrier to liability under general maritime law as
an insurer. 29
C. Congressional Action and Preemption of Federal and State Law
When Congress has legislated in an area, courts apply a rebuttable
presumption of preemption. 30 Although neither courts nor commentators
have expressly applied this presumption to COGSA, courts invariably
decide that COGSA is the exclusive remedy for loss to cargo. 31 In practice,
then, courts have assumed that congressional action in thebills of lading
area has preempted supplemental remedies ufider general maritime law.32
1. Presumption of Preemption
The Supreme Court has ruled that federal common law has been pre-
empted as to every question to which the legislative scheme has "spoke[n]
directly," and every problem that Congress has "addressed." '33 While
federalism concerns create a presumption against preemption of state law,
the principle of separation of powers creates a presumption in favor of
preemption of federal common law.34 Thus, where a federal statute regu-
package limitation section directly follows the section 4(4) provisions for carrier liability for unreasona-
ble deviations, it is "difficult. . . to believe that Congress did not intend this limitation to apply to the
section preceding it"), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963).
29. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("in any event" language
of the first paragraph of section 4(5) is too unclear to indicate such a drastic change in the law); see also
Nemeth v. General S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1982); Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833,835-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966). The position of the
First, Third, and Fourth Circuits is unclear. The remaining circuits are not likely to decide the question.
See cases collected in Annotation, Deviation From Terms of Contract of Carriage as Affecting
Limitation on Liability of Carrier or Ship, Under § 4(5) of Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (46 U.S.C.S.
§ 1304(5)), 67 A.L.R. FED. 254, 263 (1984).
30. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (congressional enactment of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982), preempted the
remedy available for federal authorities under general maritime law to seek abatement of a nuisance
caused by pollution); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981) (FWPCA preempts
recovery for damages caused by pollution of navigable waters based on the Refuse Act (Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976)), the common law of nuisance, or
maritime tort law).
31. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
32. One court expressly recognized this principle in regards to COGSA. National Automotive
Publications v. United States Lines, 486 F. Supp. 1094, 1099, 1101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (COGSA
preempts common law theories).
33. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
34. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,317 &n.9 (1981); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664
F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981).
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lates federal common law, courts apply a very strong presumption of
preemption. 35 Although admiralty is governed exclusively by federal law, 36
courts sometimes apply the presumption less forcefully to judge-made
maritime law than to nonmaritime federal common law.37
2. Factors Which May Overcome Presumption of Preemption
Several factors may operate to overcome the presumption of preemp-
tion. 38 First, any statutory terms explicitly preserving judge-made law are
controlling. 39 Second, a court must determine whether the common law
merely fills a gap left by congressional silence, or rewrites rules that
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. 40 The greater the
scope of the legislative scheme, the less likely it is that judge-made law
merely fills a gap left by Congress. 41 Finally, the degree of acceptance of
the principle at common law must be considered. Congress is less likely to
have intended preemption of "long established and familiar principles" of
the common law or general maritime law, without expressing that inten-
tion.42
3. Preemption of Maritime Law
The presumption of preemption remains a strong limitation on admiralty
courts' interstitial authority. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,43 the
Supreme Court held that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 44
35. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314.
36. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917) (constitutional requirements and
concerns for uniformity in admiralty mandate that although admiralty actions may be brought in state
courts, general maritime law, not state law, applies).
37. Osivego Barge, 664 F.2d at 335-37. Federal courts have a more expansive role to play in the
development of maritime law than in the development of nonmaritime common law and consequently
may be less bound by the presumption of preemption. But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (admiralty courts not free to supplement Death on the High Seas Act, providing
for recovery of "pecuniary damages" for wrongful death with the loss of society remedy available under
general maritime law). Preemption of maritime law is discussed infra in text accompanying notes
43-47.
38. Oswego Barge, 664 F.2d at 335.
39. Id. A "saving clause" retaining all common law remedies is an example of such language. See
supra note 8.
40. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.
41. Oswego Barge, 664 F.2d at 339.
42. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). The presumption of preemption may be
stronger in those cases where the judge attempts to fashion a new remedy because of the lack of a long-
established rule of common law. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,
271 (1979).
43. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
44. Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) § 2, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1982).
530
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authorizing recovery of pecuniary damages for wrongful death on the high
seas, speaks directly to the broad question of damages. Consequently, an
admiralty court may not supplement the statute with the loss of society
remedy available in general maritime law.45 DOHSA's silence on*the
express question of loss of society damages did not provide grounds to
grant such a remedy under general maritime law.46 Higginbotham supplies
a test for evaluating the extent to which the statute prevents a court from
adding remedies available under general maritime law or other common
law: whether the statute speaks directly to the question. 47
D. Punitive Damages in Admiralty and the Carriage of Goods
In 1936, the year Congress enacted COGSA, the Second Circuit stated
that admiralty damages are not punitive, and consequently are limited to
amounts necessary to return the injured party to their original condition.48
This 1936 opinion reflects a general reluctance to impose punitive damages
in admiralty.49 Admiralty courts, however, recognized the availability of
punitive damages in tort actions as early as 1818.50 Today, admiralty courts
45. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.
46. Id. at 625. Although the Court recognized that DOHSA does not address every issue of
wrongful death law, the Court reasoned that awarding general maritime law remedies would make
DOHSA meaningless because the statute spoke directly to damages and "[i]n the area covered by the
statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a
different statute of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries." Id.
47. Id. This test was reaffirmed in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).
48. The West Arrow, 80 F.2d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1936) (admiralty damages governed by principle of
restitutio in integrum); Note, Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 995, 996 (1967).
49. See Comment, Punitive Damages in the Admiralty, 5 MAR. LAW. 223, 226-27 (1980); infra
notes 50, 55.
50. The Amicable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818) (dicta in maritime trespass action
acknowledged potential for punitive damages for "lawless misconduct"). The first award of punitive
damages in admiralty came in Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 Fed. Cas. 1091, 1093 (No. 5196) (N.D. Cal.
1859), aff'd, 30 Fed. Cas. 781 (No. 18,124) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859) (punitive damages in maritime tort
action for unlawful deportation to the Sandwich Islands, a tort "high-handed and deliberate, in open
and contemptuous violation of. . . inviolable rights of the citizen"). See generally Comment, supra
note 49, at 224-26; Note, supra note 48, at 996-97 (summary of punitive damages in admiralty).
Punitive damages were not awarded again in a reported admiralty case until the 1967 decision of In re
Den Norske Amerika-linje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163, 196-99 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (several seamen killed
after collision in heavy fog because captain attempted to beach vessel rather than abandon ship), rev'd
sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969) (implying that punitive
damages could be assessed if given proper facts, reversed on grounds that defendant had neither ratified
nor authorized acts justifying punitive damages), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). See also Note,
supra note 48, at 1001-08 (citing no cases awarding punitive damages in maritime tort cases between
1859 and 1967, and noting that punitive damages have not yet achieved acceptance in admiralty as of
1967). See generally Comment, Punitive Damages in Admiralty for Bad Faith Refusal to Provide
Maintenance and Cure: Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 15 SAN Dmao L. REv. 309, 314 (1978) (lack of
any decision awarding punitive damages between 1859 and 1967 indicates that availability of punitive
damages in admiralty was questionable).
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have discretion5' to impose punitive damages for the maritime torts of
wrongful death, 52 maintenance and cure, 53 and, according to a new body of
case law, against insurance companies for outrageous conduct in the
handling of claims. 54 Nonetheless, admiralty courts have retained a restric-
tive view regarding punitive damages in actions arising from the con-
tractual relationship between maritime shippers and carriers. 55
In a 1985 opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit in Thyssen, Inc.
v. S.S. Fortune Star56 reversed a trial court award of punitive damages for a
willful quasi-deviation of on-deck stowage.57 The court concluded that
deviation is nothing more than an intentional breach of contract. 58 The
court stated that in general maritime breach of contract actions, punitive
damages are not recoverable unless the conduct constituting the breach is
51. Thyssen, Inc., v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1985) (even where the
elements of punitive damages are established, the court is not bound to award such damages).
52. In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); In
re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 624-27 (5th. Cir. 1981).
53. Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048, 1051 (Ist Cir. 1973). "Maintenance and cure"
refers to a seamen's right under general maritime law to receive compensation and care for illness and
injury occurring while in the service ofa ship. It is not, however, the exclusive remedy for such injuries.
See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 281.
54. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & G. OVEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 2, at 11 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] and cases cited therein; see also Note,
Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV.
161, 172-76 (1986).
55. Prior to Armada Supply v. SIT Agios Nikolas, only one court had actually awarded punitive
damages in an action arising out of a shipper-carrier contract. That award was reversed. Thyssen, Inc. v.
S.S. Fortune Star, 596 F Supp. 865, 866-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 777 F.2d
57, 66 (2d Cir. 1985). The Thyssen court was the first appellate court to extensively consider the
availability of punitive damages in actions governed by maritime contracts. 777 F.2d at 62 (court unable
to locate any admiralty decision awarding punitive damages for or arising out of a contract breach).
The reluctance to impose punitive damages in the context of shipper and carrier contract actions
which are usually governed by statute may reflect the general desire not to impose such damages
without express statutory authorization. See Dahlquist, Punitive Damages Under theJonesAct, 6 MAR.
LAv 1, 27-28 (1981); see also Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277, 280
(W.D.N.C. 1963) ("absent express Congressional intention punitive damages [are] not recoverable
• . . on a federally created cause of action;" recovery of punitive damages denied under the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act). However, courts interpreting civil rights actions have held
otherwise. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965) (police officer's improper arrest of
plaintiff and subsequent denial of medical and legal assistance in jail warranted punitive damages
despite a lack of authorization in the statute).
56. 777 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
57. In Thyssen, a cargo owner sought compensatory and punitive damages for loss to cargo brought
about by the "quasi-deviation" of on-deck stowage. The cargo owner claimed that the on-deck stowage
was an intentional fraud and deviation by defendants justifying punitive damages. Id. at 59. The trial
court found it inappropriate to limit the award to contract damages where the conduct and deviation of
the vessel worked a fraud upon the owner of the cargo, and awarded $25,000 in punitive damages. Id. at
60.
58. Id. at 63-64. Judge Friendly refused to rule that a deviation was equivalent to the tort of
conversion. Id. at 64-65.
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also an independent willful tort.59 Since mere deviation remains in the
realm of contract, not of tort,6° punitive damages were precluded. 61
Judge Friendly identified a list of factors thought to justify punitive
damages: punishing the'defendant, deterring others, preserving the peace,
inducing private enforcement of laws, compensating victims for otherwise
noneconomic losses, and paying plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 62 The court of
appeals found that few of these factors apply to unauthorized on-deck
stowage. 63 More importantly, because mere deviation was left in the realm
of contract, the court expressly declined to consider whether the "damage
actually sustained" limitation in section 4(5) of COGSA bars punitive
damages. 64
In addition to the Second Circuit's opinion, several district courts have
considered the availability of punitive damages in cargo claim cases. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York declined
to grant a shipper punitive damages for a carrier's intentional delay in
shipping.65 That court did not address punitive damages under COGSA,
but relied on the lack of criminal indifference to civil obligations and the
absence of intent to harm a public interest in refusing to award punitive
damages. 66 Only one court has considered whether COGSA prohibits
punitive damages.67 A district court in the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
because courts interpret the "in no event" language in the "damage
actually sustained" provision according to its literal meaning,68 a plain
reading of COGSA precludes punitive damages. 69
59. Id. at 63 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNtRAcrs § 355 (1979)). An intentional or even
malicious breach is insufficient for punitive damages. The breach itself must be a willful tort. 777 F.2d
at 63.
60. 777 F.2d at 63-64.
61. Id. at 62-63; see also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the
Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 222 (1977)).
62. 777 F.2d at 66 (citing Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 3-12 (1982)).
63. 777 F.2d at 66. The court found that punitive damages would not deter undesirable conduct in
deviations because deterrence is already obtained by disallowing exceptions in the bill of lading. Id. The
court also noted that insurance for punitive damages would impose costs on all shippers to confer
extraordinary benefits on a few. Id.
64. Id. at 68.
65. B.F. McKernin & Co. v. United States Lines, 416 . Supp. 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
66. Id. (quoting numerous New York decisions on punitive damages); see also Seguros Banvenez,
S.A. v. SIS Oliver Drescher, 761 E2d 855, 861 (2d Cir. 1985) (trial court did not abuse discretion by
refusing to award punitive damages on grounds that the carrier was not "guilty of gross negligence, or
actual malice or criminal indifference").
67. Cosmos U.S.A. v. United States Lines, 1983 A.M.C. 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
68. Id. at 1173. See supra note 3 (text of COGSA § 4(5)).
69. Cosmos. 1983 A.M.C. at 1173.
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II. ARMADA SUPPLY V. SIT AGIOS NIKOLAS: A GO-AHEAD FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ACTIONS GOVERNED BY COGSA
The conduct of the owners of the Agios Nikolas, went far beyond the
"mere deviation" in Thyssen. To punish the owners for their reprehensible
conduct and to deter future carriers from similar conduct, the court ex-
pressly considered the issue left unanswered by Judge Friendly in Thyssen,
finding that section 4(5) does not prohibit punitive damages. Consequently,
the court considered itself free to award punitive damages under general
maritime law according to the independent willful tort standard recited, but
not relied on, in Thyssen.70
A. Facts of Armada Supply
Armada Supply was the consignee for 348,000 barrels of fuel oil shipped
aboard the Agios Nikolas to New York from Rio de Janeiro under a clean
bill of lading. 71 Armada Supply intended to resell the cargo to Sun Oil
Company. At Rio de Janeiro, a surveyor certified that the oil met the
standards in the resale contract. 72 A falling oil market, however, left
Armada Supply in a precarious position. 73 Any discrepancy with the terms
of the resale contract would give Sun Oil grounds to demand new negotia-
tions based on the lower spot market prices.
When the Agios Nikolas arrived in New York the cargo was short 8,000
barrels and its quality was well below the requirements of the resale
contract. 74 Armada Supply's insurers demanded that the carrier's agent
post a bond to cover Armada Supply's claim for shortage and con-
tamination. The agent refused, and the insurers brought suit to arrest the
vessel. 75 Before the warrant could be executed, however, the Agios Nikolas
70. Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1985), cited in Armada Supply
v. S/T Agios Nikolas, 639 F. Supp. 1161, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Thyssen reasoned that punitive
damages are available in contract actions governed by general maritime law if the conduct constituting
the breach is also an independent willful tort. However, Thyssen did not apply this standard to award
punitive damages. This standard may therefore be considered dicta.
71. Armada Supply v. S/T Agios Nikolas, 613 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
72. Id. at 1462. The resale contract specified delivery in New York before December 10, 1982, and
set maximum bottom sediment, water content, and flow temperature standards. Id. Samples taken in
Rio de Janeiro were well below these limits. Id.
73. Id. at 1463. Armada Supply's precarious position was revealed to the owners of the Agios
Nikolas when Armada Supply offered a $20,000 speed bonus for timely delivery. Id.
74. Id. at 1463. For example, the survey on arrival indicated that 1663 barrels of salt water had
contaminated the cargo. Id. Sun Oil rejected the oil for nonconformity, although later agreed to a lower
price for the entire shipment. Id.
75. Id. By filing a libel in rem in the district court where the vessel can be found, a party holding a
lien against a vessel for outstanding claims may have a marshall "arrest" the ship. See generally G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 787-88.
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fled New York harbor. The vessel's owner threatened to sail away and sell
the cargo elsewhere unless Armada Supply promised to cancel the warrant
and to pay all freight charges. 76 For two weeks, while Armada Supply
negotiated for the return of the cargo, the Agios Nikolas remained outside
United States territorial waters, syphoning fuel from Armada Supply's
cargo for the vessel's fuel tanks. 77 Faced with a rapidly falling oil market,
Armada Supply paid the freight charges and promised not to arrest the
vessel.78
B. The Court's Reasoning
The district court awarded the $4,130,900 in compensatory damages
and expenses requested by Armada Supply.79 In a second opinion, the trial
judge assessed $250,000 in punitive damages based upon the legislative
history of COGSA and the Thyssen opinion. 80 The trial court found no
evidence that Congress intended to change the law of punitive damages by
enacting COGSA in 1936.81 Accordingly, the court ruled that "where
Congress has expressed no intention to change accepted principles of
general maritime law, courts should apply those accepted principles."
' 82
The court in Armada Supply found the conduct of the owners of the Agios
Nikolas to be far more egregious than the "mere deviation" in Thyssen. The
court determined that the owners intentionally converted Armada Supply's
property in order to blackmail Armada Supply into canceling the arrest
warrant. 83 The court concluded that such a tortious conversion supplied the
necessary independent willful tort to impose punitive damages under
general maritime law.84
According to the court, the "damage actually sustained" limitation does
not prohibit punitive damages. Congress inserted the clause to address
carriers' concerns that courts would construe the $500 package limitation
76. Armada Supply, 613 F. Supp. at 1464. The freight charges had been prepaid in Brazil. Id.
77. Id. at 1462-63. The court found that theAgiosNikolas absconded with the cargo, converted the
cargo for use in her own bunkers, and held it for ransom. Id. at 1464.
78. Id. at 1464.
79. Id. at 1470. The court calculated damages as the difference between the contract proceeds
Armada Supply would have received from Sun Oil had the fuel oil been delivered at the quality specified
in the contract, and the price Armada finally received on the open market. Id. at 1469 n.5. The court also
assessed damages for Armada's expenses in connection with recovery, storage, reconditioning, and
resale of the cargo, including charges for barging, pumping, demurrage, chemical analysis, and
demulsification. Id. at 1470.
80. Armada Supply, 639 F. Supp. at 1165.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959)).
83. 639 F. Supp. at 1162-63.
84. Id. at 1163.
535
Washington Law Review
as liquidated damages and impose liability of $500 per package on carriers
even where the loss was less. 85 Consequently, in the court's reasoning, the
"damage actually sustained" limitation merely clarifies the package lim-
itation and applies only where damage to cargo is less than $500 per
package.86
The court in Armada Supply rejected as "unpersuasive" the ruling of a
district court in the Ninth Circuit that a plain reading of COGSA's
"damage actually sustained" limitation prohibits punitive damages. 87 The
court observed that the Second Circuit often looks beyond the literal terms
of COGSA to firmly-entrenched rules of maritime law. 88 Unreasonable
deviations, the court noted, deprive a carrier of COGSA's damage limita-
tions despite equally strong language in the limitation of the first paragraph
of section 4(5) that "in any event" a carrier shall not be liable for damages
greater than $500 per package. 89 Therefore, courts in the Second Circuit
need not give literal effect to the "in no event" language in the "damage
actually sustained" limitation in the second paragraph. 90 Freed of any
COGSA limits, the court decided that the independent willful tort of
conversion could support punitive damages. 91
III. THE RESULT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF ARMADA SUPPLY
The court in Armada Supply reached the proper result. COGSA should
not shield the extremely culpable defendant merely because a shipper's
goods remain on board the vessel. Nonetheless, the court failed to offer a
sound legal basis or a persuasive public policy rationale for its action. The
analysis employed by the court to award punitive damages relies on three
faulty premises: (1) precedent not applicable to punitive damages under
COGSA; (2) a faulty analogy to other maritime doctrines; and (3) an
excessively restrictive reading of COGSA's legislative history. None of
these rationales justifies disregarding the exclusivity of COGSA's re-
medies or the plain effect of the "damage actually sustained" limitation as
85. Id. at 1164-65. The "damage actually sustained" language, the court noted, was one of the few
changes made by Congress from the text adopted at the Brussels Convention. See Uniform Ocean Bills
of Lading: Hearings on S. 1152 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1936) (letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Rep. Bland on changes to the
Brussels Convention of 1924).
86. Armada Supply, 639 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
87. Id. at 1163 (citing Cosmos U.S.A., v. United States Lines, 1983 A.M.C. 1172 (N.D. Cal.
1980)). See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
88. 639 F. Supp. at 1163-64.
89. Id.; COGSA § 4(5), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1982); see supra note 3 (text of COGSA § 4(5)).
90. 639 F. Supp. at 1163-64.
91. Id. at 1163.
Vol 62:523, 1987
Punitive Damages Under COGSA
prohibiting punitive damages. The court also failed to establish a standard
for the imposition of punitive damages sufficient to protect the integrity and
exclusivity of COGSA.
A. The Court's Faulty Analysis
The starting point for the court's resort to general maritime law was
congressional silence in 1936 on punitive damages. The court stated that
this silence indicates that Congress did not intend to change "accepted
principles of general maritime law." Therefore, courts could use those
principles to award punitive damages. 92 To support this proposition, the
court cited a 1959 Supreme Court decision refusing to apply COGSA's
liability limitations to a stevedore or to a carrier's agent. The Court had held
that because agents have historically been subject to full liability for their
actions, COGSA could not limit stevedore or agent's liability without
express congressional language overruling the common law.93
The court in Armada Supply misapplied this principle. The Supreme
Court had focused on whether COGSA altered prior accepted common
law.94 The issue in Armada Supply, however, was whether a new principle
in general maritime law ought to apply to a preexisting, exclusive statutory
scheme. 95 If punitive damages had been available to cargo claimants before
COGSA, and COGSA had failed to address the issue, the court could apply
such an antecedent principle of general maritime law. At the time of
COGSA's adoption, however, punitive damages had never been awarded in
an admiralty contract action or in an action related to the carriage of
goods.96 In fact, only one admiralty decision had awarded punitive
92. Id. at 1165. We are, however, left to assume that the "accepted principle" lies in the availability
of punitive damages in contract actions under general maritime law as explained by Judge Friendly's
1985 decision in Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). See supra notes 56-64
and accompanying text. It seems that the court in Armada Supply is not referring to the availability of
punitive damages for maritime torts since the court cites no cases on this point and explicitly refused to
allow an independent action for tortious conversion. In addition, since the court refers to an "accepted
principle at general maritime law," it is clear that the court is not referring to accepted principles of
common law.
93. Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959) ("[n]o statute is
to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import"), quoted in Armada Supply,
639 F. Supp. at 1165. Whether the Supreme Court was referring to state and federal common law or
general maritime law by use of the phrase "common law" in Herd is not clear. The court in Armada
Supply clearly had general maritime law in mind. See 639 F. Supp. at 1165.
94. Herd, 359 U.S. at 304-05.
95. Punitive damages are a recent development in admiralty. See supra notes 48-55.
96. See supra notes 50,55. In Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985),
the court recited the independent willful tort standard, but could find no admiralty decision awarding
punitive damages in a contract-related action.
Although not cited inArmada Supply or Thyssen, an admiralty decision, in a suit based on a contract
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damages prior to 1967. 97 To state that punitive damages were available
based on any principle of general maritime law accepted before the enact-
ment of COGSA was thus inaccurate.
The court's second justification for punitive damages was an analogy to
deviation. Section 4(5) contains an "in any event" limitation (the package
limitation) and an "in no event" limitation (the damage actually sustained
limitation). 98 The court in Armada Supply began by noting that the Second
Circuit disregards the literal effect of the "in any event" limitation in
deviation cases. The court then reasoned by analogy that it need not give
literal effect to the "damage actually sustained" limitation in awarding
damages.99
The court's analogy is improper for two reasons. First, the analogy is
based on precedent which addressed whether the enactment of COGSA in
1936 altered the long-standing doctrine of deviation. The issue in Armada
Supply, however, was whether the theory of punitive maritime damages,
developed in the last few years, may be introduced into the supposedly
exclusive legislative scheme of COGSA. 100 The ancient general maritime
law doctrine of deviation permits courts to ignore the natural effect of the
of passenger carriage, had previously considered whether a passenger could collect punitive damages
for misrepresentations made by the carrier that no steerage passengers would be on board during a
cholera outbreak. The Normannia, 62 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1894). That court found that the defendant
lacked the requisite wrongful intent to deceive necessary to impose punitive damages. Id. at 480. This
decision should not be seen as implicitly recognizing the availability of punitive damages in admiralty
for contract actions since the court analyzed the claim as a separate maritime tort with liability turning
on whether the deception was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 472, 480. Moreover, unlike
COGSA actions, no statutory scheme prevented a separate, independent action for tort recovery.
Although not discussed by the court in Armada Supply, in theory courts might impose punitive
damages based on independent torts such as conversion and misrepresentation. However, admiralty
courts have consistently refused to permit separate tort actions when COGSA governs the relationship
of the parties. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
97. In re Den Norske Amerika-linje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163, 196-99 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (several
seamen killed after collision in heavy fog because captain attempted to beach vessel rather than abandon
ship), rev'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969) (implying
that punitive damages could be assessed if given proper facts, reversed on grounds that defendant had
neither ratified nor authorized acts justifying punitive damages), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); see
supra note 50 (no reported admiralty decision awarding punitive damages between 1859 and 1967).
98. See supra note 3 (text of COGSA § 4(5)).
99. Armada Supply, 639 F. Supp. at 1163-64.
100. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits disregard the literal meaning of the "in any event"
language in deviation cases because of the long-standing general maritime law rule depriving the carrier
of liability limitations for a deviation. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. In contrast,
punitive damages in admiralty actions-contract or tort-are a recent development. In fact, Armada
Supply is the first decision to award punitive damages in the contract of carriage context that has not
been reversed on appeal. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text (punitive damages in admi-
ralty). Armada Supply was not, however, appealed. Although there is historical precedent for punitive
damages for maritime torts, only since 1972 have such damages been awarded with regularity. See supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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"in any event" limitation. No long-standing maritime principle of punitive
damages exists, however, which might prevent a court from invoking the
plain effect of the "damage actually sustained" limitation as prohibiting
punitive damages. 101 Second, the entire doctrine of deviation itself may be
inconsistent with COGSA102 and expansion of the doctrine is disfavored in
most jurisdictions, including the Second Circuit. 103 Relying on an incon-
sistent exception, whose further expansion has been expressly limited, to
create a new and also inconsistent exception to the damage limitations
defies logic.
As a third rationale to a punitive damage award, the court in Armada
Supply looked to COGSA's legislative history. The court found that the
"damage actually sustained" limitation does not prohibit punitive damages
but merely allays carrier fears that the limitation might be applied as
liquidated damages.'°4 However, the court's review of COGSA's legis-
lative history was too narrow. Although the limitation clearly addresses
such carrier concerns, 10 5 it also establishes a carrier's maximum liability.
Additionally, the court's restricted interpretation ignores extensive prece-
dent and the logical structure of COGSA's remedial scheme.
Legislative history not cited by the court in Armada Supply indicates that
Congress fully understood the broad implications of the "in no event"
language in the "damage actually sustained" limitation. 106 In addition, the
court's narrow reading of section 4(5) ignores congressional intent to
reduce the carriers' extensive liability under general maritime law in
exchange for restrictions on their ability to disclaim liability in the bill of
101. The circuits following the majority rule of the Second Circuit are applying the principle from
the 1959 Supreme Court decision cited but misapplied by Armada Supply: for COGSA to overturn a
long-held general maritime rule (such as insurer liability for deviations) it must do so expressly. Robert
C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959); see supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
102. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
103. See id.
104. Armada Supply, 639 F. Supp. at 1164; see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text
("damage actually sustained" limitation inserted to deny recovery of entire $500 if value less than
$500).
105. Carriers did express such concerns. See Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading: House Hearings on
S. 1152 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25
(1935) (statement of A.B. Barber, Manager, Transportation and Communications Dept., United States
Chamber of Commerce: the $500 per package limitation in section 4(5) "does not mean they [shippers]
will get $500 for every package, but they will get the value, if it is within $500")
106. A memorandum prepared for Congress by the State Department to explain COGSA's effect
on present law indicates that Congress understood the full implications of section 4(5): "[section 4(5)]
permits the fixing by contract of a higher, but not a lower, maximum value than $500, provided that in
no event shall the carrier be liable for more than actual value." Uniform Ocean Bills ofLading: House
Hearings on S. 1152 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (1935) (emphasis added).
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lading. 107 The court's narrow interpretation of section 4(5) is inconsistent
with this broader intent.
Moreover, the court's qualified version of the "damage actually sus-
tained" limitation is contrary to accepted maritime precedent and funda-
mental contract principles. Under the court's restrictive interpretation, the
"damage actually sustained" limitation in section 4(5) would operate as a
ceiling on carrier liability only in those contracts governed by the package
limitation. 108 However, courts consistently interpret the "damage actually
sustained" limitation as an ultimate ceiling on carrier liability in all bills of
lading. 109 The placement of the "damage actually sustained" limitation
directly after the provision permitting the parties to contract for greater
carrier liability strongly supports this conclusion. Without a uniform and
final "damage actually sustained" limit on carrier liability in both the $500
package and the value-declared situations, the cargo owner declaring value
gains an opportunity for recovery greater than actual value. 110 Such recov-
ery would represent a windfall to the shipper and would violate the
fundamental principle of actual loss which governs contracts between
shippers and carriers. 1t1
107. See supra notes 6, 18 and accompanying text.
108. See Armada Supply, 639 F. Supp. at 1164-65. Under the Armada Supply analysis, the
"damage actually sustained" limitation would have effect only in those cases in which the $500
package limitation applies and loss is less than $500.
109. Internatio, Inc. v. M.S. Taimyr, 602 F.2d 49,50 (2d Cir. 1979) ("damage actually sustained"
provision limits shipper's recovery to what the cargo owner would have received had the resale contract
been performed); Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, 636 F.2d 807, 824 (2d Cir. 1981) (to award
prejudgment interest from before the time goods should have been delivered violates "damage actually
sustained" limitation); Marcraft Clothes, Inc. v. M/V Kurobe Maru, 575 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(ruling that $500 package limitation applies, but denying summary judgment because defendant failed
to prove extent of "damage actually sustained").
110. Although courts could invoke common law damage principles to limit damages, under
Armada Supply logic, the statute itself would permit recovery of full market price in the event of delay
regardless of whether the shipper incurred any actual loss at all. No problem arises when value is greater
than $500 because the package limitation still provides a final ceiling. When parties contract for the full
value of the goods, however, there would be no ceiling on recovery. If the cargo was only partially
damaged, the carrier would still be liable for the amount in the contract. Such damages are void under
the presently accepted, broader interpretation of the "damage actually sustained" limitation. See
Holden v. S.S. Kendall Fish, 395 F.2d 910,912 (5th Cir. 1968) ("damage actually sustained" limitation
requires that damages be measured by fair market value at destination and not agreed damages based on
invoice price); B.F. McKernin & Co. v. United States Lines, 416 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
supra note 3 (text of COGSA § 4(5)).
111. See D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW REMEDIES § 5.10, at 377-78 (1973) (although a
variety of standards exist to measure loss of goods on a contract of carriage, the basic goal is
compensation for actual loss).
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B. Armada Supply Creates an Excessively Low Standard for
Imposition of Punitive Damages in Actions Governed by COGSA
Even if the Armada Supply court had properly analyzed the issues, a
more serious error lies in the court's unacceptable standard for imposing
punitive damages. In setting this standard, the court relied on dicta from
Judge Friendly's decision in Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star 12 which
stated that punitive damages might be available in a contract action only if
the contract breach is also a willful tort.11 3 By thus exempting willful torts,
the court drilled a hole in the intended exclusivity of COGSA that could
sink the entire Act. 114
The court did not define "willful" 15 and thus did not articulate whether
a court may resort to general maritime law only for intentional torts, for
willful, wanton, and reckless torts, or on some other basis. 116 This provides
no guidance as to either the degree of culpability required or the kinds of
general maritime law remedies available under this exception."17
The court's willful tort standard is inconsistent with the purposes and
goals of COGSA. The Armada Supply requirement for identifying an
independent willful tort is foreign to the concept that COGSA encompasses
both tort and contract principles. 118 The imposition of punitive damages in
COGSA governed actions must be based on culpability, rather than on
112. The decision in Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985), is discussed
supra in text accompanying notes 56-64.
113. Armada Supply, 639 F Supp. at 1162.
114. COGSA is the exclusive remedy for both contract and tort actions. See supra notes 7-13 and
accompanying text.
115. No accurate or consistent definition of "willful" exists. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1982) (referring to terms such as "willful"
and "wanton" as the "recklessness group"). willful conduct can mean either intentional or reckless
disregard of the law. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,394-96 (1933). Prosser defines
willful and wanton as a state of mind lying between actual intent to do harm and the mere unreasonable
risk of harm to another involved in ordinary negligence, or as conscious indifference to the rights of
others. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, § 34, at 212.
116. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, § 34, at 212. A variety of standards exist for
the imposition of punitive damages in contract actions. See, e.g., Art Janpol Volkswagen, Inc. v. Fiat
Motors of N. Am., 767 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1985) (punitive damages not recoverable for breach of
contract unless breach is maliciously intentional, fraudulent or oppressive, or committed recklessly or
with a wanton disregard of rights); see also Splitt v. Deltona Corp., 662 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981)
(punitive damages available if act causing breach of contract also amounts to intentional tort); see
generally Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward
Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1565 (1986).
117. By failing to define the conduct which permits resort to general maritime law, or the remedies
available in general maritime law under the exception, the court may have created a COGSA general
maritime "saving clause." See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
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general reference to a class of torts. 119 The court's standard would permit an
award of damages under general maritime law for willful torts such as
conversion even though COGSA clearly governs and prohibits such an
award. 120 To impose punitive damages on a carrier for conduct within the
intended scope of COGSA, while continuing to allow a shipper to collect
compensatory damages under a favorable presumption of carrier liability,
upsets the balance of interests that Congress accepted in 1936.121 The
court's low standard would inevitably make the outcome under COGSA
unpredictable and increase the cost of suits under COGSA for all parties. 122
In ordinary contract situations, the rule that punitive damages are avail-
able for breaches where the conduct constituting the breach is also a willful
tort may be appropriate. 123 However, because COGSA regulates both
tortious and contractual behavior, determining what conduct permits use of
general maritime law to impose punitive damages requires more.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR ANALYSIS: PREEMPTION
AND CRIMINALLY CULPABLE CONDUCT
The better analysis focuses on whether and to what extent congressional
action in the bills of lading area preempts general maritime law. Such a
preemption analysis provides a firm analytical foundation for a standard to
impose punitive damages which preserves the integrity of COGSA. The
court's analysis in Armada Supply depended extensively on a lack of
express congressional intent to prohibit punitive damages. 124 Such analysis
does not consider the substantial scope and exclusive nature of COGSA and
therefore cannot be used to define the limits of the conduct to which the
statute was intended to apply. A preemption analysis considers this scope
and delineates the conduct that COGSA controls. Criminally culpable
119. Generally, the conduct of the party, not the classification of the conduct, should provide the
basis for punitive damages. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, § 2, at 11.
120. See supra notes 7-13.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 14.
122. The COGSA burden of proof provisions attempt to clarify and simplify recovery. See
generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 183-85. See also supra note 14 and accompanying
text. Yet, after Armada Supply, plaintiffs would have incentive to present additional claims for punitive
damages in virtually every action based on lost or missing cargo, causing an increase in the length and
cost of litigation. Conceivably, the availability of punitive damages at trial could distort if not prevent
settlement of claims.
123. Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 355 (1979). But see, e.g., Splitt v. Deltona Corp., 662 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding an independent tort alone is sufficient to support punitive damages in a contract action; it need
not be willful).
124. See supra notes 81-82, 92-97 and accompanying text.
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conduct'2 5 falls outside of COGSA's control and is thus within the court's
law-making role and properly subject to the imposition of punitive
damages.
A. COGSA Bars Supplemental Remedies Under General Maritime Law
Had the court in Armada Supply used a preemption analysis based on the
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham "speak to the question" test for preemp-
tion, 126 the presumption of preemption, 127 and the factors which might
overcome that presumption, 128 it would have concluded that the legislative
scheme of COGSA prevents courts from supplementing the statute with
remedies from general maritime law. 129 A finding of preemption, however,
does not end the inquiry. The second step must be to define the limits of
preemption and the conduct to which courts retain authority to impose
remedies under general maritime law.
The decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham states that supplemen-
tal remedies under general maritime law are not available if the statute
speaks directly to the question. 130 COGSA speaks directly to the broad
question of liability for damages or loss in connection with the transport of
goods by sea. 131 Consequently, Higginbotham mandates the presumption
that COGSA prevents resorting to general maritime law to award punitive
damages for all conduct within its scope.
Moreover, the factors which might rebut this presumption only reinforce
the conclusion of preemption. 132 First, COGSA lacks any express term or
"saving clause" to retain general maritime law remedies. 133 Second, the
125. As used herein, "criminally culpable conduct" is defined as conduct exhibiting reckless
indifference to the rights of others and the intent to commit criminal acts.
126. 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981); see
supra notes 33, 40, 43-47 and accompanying text (federal common law has been preempted as to
questions to which a congressional statute "speaks directly").
127. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981); see supra notes 30-37 and
accompanying text.
128. Three factors will be applied: any specific language in COGSA retaining general maritime
law remedies and principles, whether an examination of the scope of the statute indicates that the
principle fills a gap or rewrites the statute, and the degree of acceptance of the principle under general
maritime law. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
129. See National Automotive Publications v. United States Lines, 486 F. Supp. 1094, 1102
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (given the exclusive nature of the remedies under COGSA, whatever common law
theories plaintiff may assert are preempted by virtue of COGSA).
130. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.
131. Higginbotham applied this "speak to the question" test to prohibit the award of loss of society
damages at general maritime in an action governed by the Death on the High Seas Act. See supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 38-42, 128 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also note 8 and accompanying text (saving
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scope of COGSA reinforces the conclusion of preemption. Although
COGSA may be silent on the question of punitive damages, 134 the scope of
the statute establishes an extensive legislative scheme for recovery of
damages based on both contract and tort principles.135 In addition, all
courts recognize COGSA as the exclusive action for recovery.136 There-
fore, permitting courts to supplement COGSA remedies with general
maritime law merely on the finding of a tort, willful or otherwise, does not
"fill a gap left by Congress' silence," but instead rewrites the statute. 137
Finally, no long-standing general maritime principle of punitive damages
in contract or tort actions operates to rebut the presumption that COGSA
preempts such remedies. Punitive damages arising from the contract rela-
tionship between shippers and carriers were never incorporated from gen-
eral maritime law into the regulatory scheme of COGSA. 138
B. Limits on Preemption
COGSA represents the exclusive legislative scheme for recovery of
damages 39 and preempts supplemental remedies for recovery in connec-
tion with the shipment of goods by sea. 140 Therefore, punitive damages
would be permissible in only two situations: a congressional amendment
weaving punitive damages into the COGSA balance of interests t 41 or a
judicial ruling that the legislative scheme does not speak to the conduct in
question.
Even if COGSA preempts general maritime law remedies for some
conduct, remedies for other conduct may not have been preempted. 142
clause in the Carmack Amendment supports award of punitive damages in actions governed by the
statute).
134. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. In addition, where a statute is silent on the
availability of punitive damages, courts generally deny punitive damages. See supra note 55.
135. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
138. Before Armada Suppts; only one court had awarded punitive damages in the carrier-shipper
context. That award was reversed on appeal. See supra notes 55, 92-97 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
141. This has not happened, and there is no indication of any desire in Congress to amend COGSA.
142. The Fifth Circuit has recognized the limits of DOHSA preemption. See Bodden v. American
Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 1982) ("DOHSA's preemptive effect must be confined to its
scope:" DOHSA does not speak directly to whether widow's suit for wrongful death is precluded by her
husband's recovery for injuries during his lifetime); Note, The Fifth Circuit Navigates Between Scylla
(Higginbotham) and Charybdis (Gaudet)-Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 7 MAR. LAW. 119,
124-26 (1982). Other courts have made a similar determination with respect to the Longshore and
Harborworkers' Compensation Act. See, e.g., Seide v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 169 Cal. App. 3d 985,
215 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632 (1985). In Seide, the California Court of Appeals stated that an action under
general maritime law for injuries inflicted intentionally by employer was still available despite express
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Where conduct is beyond the scope of what Congress reasonably could
have intended a statute to govern, remedies for that conduct are not
preempted. A statute such as COGSA, enacted to guarantee compensation
for economic losses arising from the "run-of-the-mill" commercial breach,
does not address, regulate, or provide a remedy for the deceit and extortion
found by the court in Armada Supply.143 Even though COGSA provides an
exclusive remedy for both contract and tort claims, Congress could not
have intended that this kind of egregious conduct fall within the scope of the
statute and its "damage actually sustained" limitation.
C. A Proposal for a Criminal Culpability Exception to the Remedies in
COGSA
Preemption analysis leads to the conclusion that certain conduct is
beyond the scope of COGSA. Nevertheless, a clearly articulated standard
is necessary to draw the line between conduct for which COGSA is the
exclusive remedy, and conduct to which courts may apply principles of
general maritime law. A standard requiring proof of criminally culpable
conduct-defined as conduct exhibiting reckless indifference to the rights
of others and the intent to commit criminal acts-to impose punitive
damages under general maritime law, provides a reasonable and workable
standard. This standard would uphold the exclusivity and integrity of
COGSA, while allowing the imposition of punitive damages in egregious
cases like Armada Supply.
1. COGSA and Criminal Culpability
COGSA does not speak to the type of criminally culpable conduct before
the court in Armada Supply. Breach of society's norms may be classified as
contractual, tortious, or criminal, with criminal conduct generally thought
to be the most blameworthy.144 For purposes of delineating COGSA's
scope, conduct classified as criminally culpable can be defined as that
which exhibits reckless indifference to the rights of others, 145 coupled with
language in the LWHCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1982), that the employer's liability for compensation for
worker's injuries under the statute "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer
to the employee . . . at law or in admiralty."
143. Armada Supply, 613 F. Supp. at 1462.
144. See W. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAw § 1.3, at 12 (2d ed. 1986).
145. "Reckless indifference to the rights of others" is a more accurate state of mind standard since it
emphasizes the effect of the conduct on others as well as the state of mind of the wrongdoer. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979) (punitive damages awarded for conduct that
is outrageous because of the defendant's reckless indifference to the rights of others). See, e.g., Dorsey
v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 198 1) (five million dollars in punitive damages
545
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the intent to commit criminal acts. 146 COGSA was enacted to ensure
compensation for economic losses due to commercial breaches of duty. 147
COGSA expressly provides remedies for contractual, negligent, and even
intentional or willful conduct such as conversion. 148 The deceit, extortion,
and blackmail before the court in Armada Supply, however, falls into the
category of criminally culpable conduct. Such conduct is beyond the
commercial scope of COGSA. 149 Congress could not have intended that the
criminally culpable carrier be allowed to use the COGSA liability limita-
tions as a shield from full accountability. In short, the recovery of punitive
damages under general maritime law lies not in the commercial bill of
lading to which COGSA applies exclusively, but rather in the criminally
culpable conduct which COGSA does not address. 150
2. Criminal Culpability Exception Is Consistent With Existing Law
A narrow criminal culpability exception to COGSA merely delineates
the boundaries of COGSA's application. This exception maintains
COGSA's exclusive role in regulating recovery on ocean bills of lading, but
does not rewrite the statute, nor even contradict judicial precedent.
approved against car manufacturer for reckless indifference to the rights of others), modified, 670 F.2d
21 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1982); Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (W.D.
Okla. 1980) (conduct indicating reckless disregard for the rights or property of others justifies punitive
damages).
"Reckless indifference to the rights of others" as used herein is defined as:
Conduct involving a conscious choice of a course of action entailing a disproportionately great risk
of harm to the rights or property of others, and undertaken with knowledge of the potential for such
harm.
Adapted from definition in Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1982).
146. Criminal conduct is often cited as a standard for imposing punitive damages, although not an
exclusive standard. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, § 2, at 9 (punitive damages serve the
punishment and deterrence functions of criminal law and are available where defendant's wrongdoing
has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(2) comment b (1979) (purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter; "these damages
can be awarded only for conduct for which this remedy is appropriate-.., conduct involving some
element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime").
One court has defined the "moral culpability" required for punitive damages as recklessness that is
close to criminality, and cited the New York criminal definition of recklessness. Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 843 (2d Cir. 1967).
147. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
149. See W. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW § 8.12, at 789-90 (2d ed. 1986) (extortion and blackmail are
crimes against the administration of justice).
150. The availability of punitive damages in commercial settings for intentional wrongdoing
coupled with criminal intent has been recognized by courts. See, e.g., B.B. Walker Co. v. Ashland
Chem. Co., 474 F. Supp. 651, 665 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (punitive damages for tortious breach of contract
should be assessed when defendant's wrongdoing is intentional and deliberate and rises to a degree of
outrageousness frequently associated with crime).
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COGSA does not speak directly to criminally culpable conduct.' 5'
Consequently, COGSA's scheme for recovery remains exclusive for all
other conduct. COGSA's legislative scheme operates equitably. in all
situations except the rare case such as Armada Supply. COGSA applies to
govern damages caused by levels of culpability which the statute could
reasonably remedy.
Awarding punitive damages in the rare case where the party's conduct
violates all commercial norms does not conflict with precedent. A shipper
or cargo owner remains without a right to a separate action for conversion,
negligence, or breach of contract. 152 COGSA still speaks to conversion
accompanied by or resulting from less blameworthy behavior because such
conduct remains within the commercial scope of COGSA. 153 This standard
can be reconciled with existing precedent because intentional delay 54 and
willful deviation 55 lack the requisite intent to commit criminal acts.
3. Criminal Culpability Exception Better Serves the Purposes of
COGSA and Punitive Damages
The use of a criminal culpability standard to impose punitive damages
properly focuses the inquiry on the primary basis for punitive damages:
culpability. 156 Courts are properly concerned that investigation into
culpability for a determination of deviation might lead to uncertainty. 157
The uncertainty arises, however, from the doctrine of deviation, not from
the issue of culpability. 158 The inquiry into culpability should be to deter-
mine the availability of punitive damages, not to classify the conduct.
151. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 7-13 and accompanying
text.
153. Under the proposed standard, simple conversion exhibiting low levels of culpability would
lack the "reckless indifference" necessary to resort to general maritime law for punitive damages since
this kind of conversion of cargo can be compensated fully under COGSA.
154. See B.F. McKernin & Co. v. United States Lines, 416 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404-06,223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179 N.E.2d 166 (1968) ("[tlhe
series of misdirected shipments, even if done. . . with gross disregard of plaintiff's rights do [sic] not
imply criminal indifference to civil obligations, and are [sic] not so morally culpable, or. . . aimed at
the public generally as to justify. . . punitive damages").
155. See Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d57 (2d Cir. 1985);seealsosupranotes 56-64
and accompanying text. The result in Thyssen is reached not because quasi-deviation remains in the
realm of contract, but because the conduct does not exhibit criminal intent. A conscious decision to
sacrifice a cargo owner's goods by stowage on deck would, however, satisfy the definition of "reckless
indifference." In short, COGSA generally speaks to the conduct of deviation and the level of culpability
normally present.
156. See D. DOBBS, supra note 111, § 3.9, at 204-06 (punitive damages are to be awarded because
of the defendant's culpable state of mind, not because of extreme conduct standing alone).
157. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
158. The deviation doctrine has fallen into disfavor. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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Regardless of the standard applied, a court must consider culpability at
some point in awarding punitive damages. 159 Under the reasoning in
Armada Supply, however, courts would be forced to examine culpability
and classify the conduct. The difficulties behind such a dual analysis led
courts to exempt criminal conduct from the deviation doctrine. 160 In
COGSA actions, a court's inquiry into egregious conduct should focus
solely on culpability. Such a focus would simplify administration of
punitive damages by eliminating the need to classify conduct as a tort, a
breach of contract, or a deviation. 161
COGSA's failure to provide a remedy for criminally culpable conduct
has led plaintiffs to seek relief through extension of the deviation doc-
trine. 162 However, courts have refused to extend the doctrine to encompass
such conduct. 163 Under present analysis, stowage of goods on deck de-
prives the carrier of the liability limitation provisions in COGSA, but a
carrier guilty of systematic theft or accepting bribes receives the full
protection of COGSA's liability limitations. 164 In short, egregious
tortfeasors currently receive favored treatment under COGSA. 165 A stan-
dard based on criminally culpable conduct would impose punitive damages
in such circumstances. 166
159. If a court does find a "willful" tort which is not in the realm of contract, it must still determine
whether the party committing the willful tort was sufficiently culpable to award punitive damages. See
Armada Supply v. S/T Agios Nikolas, 639 F. Supp. 1161, 1162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
160. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The Armada Supply analysis requires a court
to first determine whether the conduct is in the realm of contract, or a vaguely defined "willful" tort. See
also Thyssen, 777 F.2d at 63-65.
161. Classification of conduct as tort or contract is not essential to an award of punitive damages.
See B.B. Walker Co. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 474 F. Supp. 651, 665 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
162. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., B.M.A. Indus. v. Nigerian Star Line, 786 F.2d 90,92 (2d Cir. 1986) (misdelivery of
cargo does not warrant finding of deviation even if due to criminal receipt of bribe); Italia Di
Navigazione S.P.A. v. M.V. Hermes 1, 724 F.2d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (nondelivery of cargo due to
systematic theft does not warrant finding of deviation to oust one-year statute of limitation specified in
section 3(6) of COGSA).
164. See supra note 26. Punitive damages may be especially appropriate to punish defendants for
conduct, such as criminal conduct in COGSA, which often goes unpunished. See Kink v. Combs, 28
Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965) (punitive damages appropriate to punish types of conduct that
although oppressive and harmful to the individual almost invariably go unpunished by the public
prosecutor); see also Morris, PunitiveDamages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1195-98 (1931).
165. The independent willful tort standard of Armada Supply would also encompass such conduct.
However, the court's standard is over-inclusive, permitting punitive damages for conduct that COGSA
clearly governs. A criminally culpable conduct standard reserves exemplary damages for the rare case
beyond COGSA's scope.
166. In such cases, the carrier or his agents have engaged in a conscious course of conduct to
disregard the rights of the cargo owner and to injure the goods. Even if the conduct might not be
provable beyond a reasonable doubt or satisfy the mens rea element for criminal prosecution, a jury or
judge in a civil action could make a finding of intent to commit criminal acts.
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The purposes of punitive damages' 67 are not served in the context of
carriage of goods by sea unless a party's conduct reaches criminal
culpability. To promote economic efficiency, carriers willing to comperi-
sate for losses to goods should be free to breach the contract of carriage
where the breach is economically efficient. 168 Recognizing this principle,
the Thyssen court determined that punitive damages were not available for a
deviation. Since neither the goals of deterrence nor punishment would be
served, such damages would only impose added costs on all shippers to
confer extraordinary benefits on a few. 169 Recognizing the efficiency of
some contract breaches, however, does not mean that carriers may simply
compensate for loss and engage in any conduct with impunity. The crimi-
nally culpable parties in Armada Supply violated all commercial norms.
Such criminally culpable conduct denies the public the benefits from the
expansion of commerce that COGSA's regulatory scheme promotes.170
Deterring conduct which injures the public provides the proper grounds for
imposing punitive damages. In such circumstances, punitive damages no
longer benefit the few, but deter and punish conduct presently not ad-
dressed by COGSA without impinging on the statute's valid commercial
purposes and scope.
V. CONCLUSION
The district court in Armada Supply attempted to adapt a fifty-year-old
maritime statute to the needs of today by tearing a small hole in its
application. In this case, however, only the finest craftsman could keep this
hole from sinking the ship. The integrity and exclusivity of COGSA require
that analysis of punitive damages focus on COGSA's purposes and not on
the common law concept of a willful tort. COGSA's coverage, however, is
not unlimited, and thus punitive damages should be available under general
167. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
168. E.FARNswomH, CoNrnicrs§ 12.3, at 817-18(1982). Thus, to agreatextent, carriers willing
to compensate the cargo owner for all losses should be free to breach the contract of carriage.
169. Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d. 57, 75 (2d Cir. 1985).
170. In Armada Supply two types of criminally culpable conduct can be identified. First, the Agios
Nikolas intentionally evaded legally-obtained judicial orders for arrest of the vessel. Second, extortion
and deceit were employed by the owners of the Agios Nikolas to blackmail the vulnerable Armada
Supply into dropping the warrant. Armada Supply v. S/T Agios Nikolas, 613 F. Supp. 1459, 1470
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). The public has an interest in deterring both types of criminally culpable conduct in
order to uphold the sanctity of law and the courts, and to ensure that disputes be settled through legal
means. One commentator has proposed that courts impose punitive damages in breach of contract
actions if the breach was intentional and the breaching party knew that there was no legal justification
for lack of performance or where the party breached in reckless disregard of whether a justification
existed. Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward
Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1565, 1657 (1986).
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maritime law in the rare case where a party's conduct escapes COGSA's
boundaries. Preemption analysis, focused on the scope of COGSA, pro-
vides a test for determining whether particular conduct exceeds the
boundary of the statute's application. Criminally culpable conduct-that
conduct which exhibits reckless indifference to the rights of others and the
intent to commit criminal acts-is precisely such conduct: rare and clearly
identifiable.
David M. Blachman
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